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This paper introduces the theoretical framework allowing for the binary quantization
index modulation (QIM) embedding techniques to be extended towards multiple-symbol
QIM (m-QIM, where m stands for the number of symbols on which the mark is encoded
prior to its embedding). The underlying detection method is optimized with respect to the
minimization of the average error probability, under the hypothesis of white, additive
Gaussian behavior for the attacks. This way, for prescribed transparency and robustness
constraints, the data payload is increased by a factor of log2m.
m-QIM is experimentally validated under the frameworks of the MEDIEVALS French
national project and of the SPY ITEA2 European project, related to MPEG-4 AVC robust and
semi-fragile watermarking applications, respectively. The experiments are three-folded and
consider the data payload–robustness–transparency tradeoff. In the former case, the main
benefit is the increase of data payload by a factor of log2m while keeping fixed robustness
(variations lower than 3% of the bit error rate after additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark
random bending attacks) and transparency (set to average PSNR¼45 dB and 65 dB for
SD and HD encoded content, respectively). The experiments consider 1 h of video content.
In the semi-fragile watermarking case, them-QIMmain advantage is a relative gain factor of
0.11 of PSNR for fixed robustness (against transcoding), fragility (to content alteration) and
the data payload. The experiments consider 1 h 20 min of video content.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Digital watermarking can be defined as the process
of embedding a pattern of information into a cover digital
content (image, audio, video, etc.) [1,2], as illustrated in
Fig. 1. While such a procedure can be public, the very
insertion of the mark is always controlled by some secret
information referred to as a key. Once watermarked, the
host data can be transmitted and/or stored in a hostile
environment, i.e. in an environment where changes (attacks)er B.V.
aris.eu (M. Hasnaoui).
Open access under CC BYattempting to remove the watermark are likely to occur.
The subsequent watermark detection can serve to a large
variety of applications, from property and/or integrity proof
to augmented reality.
Although there are no universal requirements to be
satisfied by all watermarking applications, some main direc-
tions are generally considered by the research studies [1,2].
In order to be effective, the watermark should be percep-
tually invisible for a human observer (i.e. the transparency
property) and its detection should be successful even when
the watermarked content is attacked (i.e. the robustness
property). Moreover, it should allow the insertion of the
amount of information (referred to as data payload) required
by the targeted application (e.g. a serial number identifying a
user, a time stamp, etc.). In order for the watermarking
techniques to be easily integrated into practical applications,
the watermark insertion/detection should be achieved at a
low computational cost.-NC-ND license. 
Fig. 1. Watermarking synopsis.
Fig. 2. Robust vs. semi-fragile watermarking. The watermarked frame (a) suffers a content preserving attack (a compression) (b) then a content alteration
attack (the insertion of a person) (c). A robust detection should allow the recovering of the mark while a semi-fragile detection should discriminate
between the legal/fake areas, (d).
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set according to the targeted application. For instance, let’s
consider the two examples of video ownership (e.g. ensure
copyright protection) and of video authentication (e.g.
ensure video surveillance integrity).
The former example relies on the so-called robust
watermarking. Such a system should feature ideal trans-
parency (i.e. human imperceptible visual differences
between the original and the marked content) and robust-
ness (i.e. the mark can be successfully recovered after each
and every attack which still preserves the commercial
value of that content). The mark itself may represent the
owner/legal user identity, a time stamp, etc. The latter
example can be based on the so-called semi-fragile water-
marking, with weaker transparency constraints but with
the possibility of discriminating between content-alteration
attacks (e.g. object deletion, spatio-temporal cropping, …)
which should destroy the mark and mundane video pro-
cessing applications (noise addition, transcoding,…) which
should allow the mark to be detected. The mark carries
some content authentication information (a signature).
Fig. 2 illustrates the difference between the robust and
the semi-fragile watermarking. A frame sampled from the
watermarked video is presented in Fig. 2a. Fig. 2b presents
a compressed version of the marked frame; the mark
should be detected by both robust and semi-fragile water-
marking. Assume now the case in which a region in the
watermarked and compressed frame was modified by
introducing a person (a content alteration attack), as
illustrated in Fig. 2c. On the one hand, the robust water-
mark method should be insensitive to such an attack and
the mark should be detected. On the other hand, thesemi-fragile watermark should be sensitive to such an
attack: the authentication mark should no longer be
detected, thus demonstrating the content modification.
Real life applications consider more elaborated use-cases,
in which the modified area should be discriminated from
the genuine one. For instance, out of processing the frame
in Fig. 2c, the mark should be detected in area where the
content was altered only by compression but not from the
area in which the person was added (see the legal/fake
areas in Fig. 2d).
In practice, video sequences are stored and distributed
in compressed bit stream formats. Consequently, water-
marking a video content would require to decode the
sequence, then to insert the watermark and, finally, to re-
encode that video. Such an approach would result into a
large computational time, mainly spent on encoding/
decoding. These two operations are intrinsically avoided
if the watermarking is performed directly in the com-
pressed video domain.
When approaching the compressed domain watermark-
ing, the main deadlock relates to the conceptual contra-
diction between compression and watermarking: while
watermarking exploits visual redundancy to hide the mark,
compression eliminates the same visual redundancy in order
to reduce the size of the stream. Therefore, compressed
video stream leaves very little (virtually any) space to hide
data. The challenge is to embed the prescribed amount of
information (set by the targeted application) directly into the
compressed streamwhile maintaining prescribed robustness
and transparency levels.
The present paper takes this challenge and advances a
theoretical framework for the multi-symbol embedding,
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respect, the insertion rule is extended from a binary alphabet
[4] to an m-ary alphabet; the underlying optimal detection
rule, in the sense of minimizing the average error in mark
detection under additive white Gaussian noise attacks is
derived. Hence, it is thus demonstrated that the data payload
can be increased by a factor of log2m, for prescribed
transparency and additive Gaussian noise power.
The advanced method was experimentally validated under
the frameworks of the MEDIEVALS French national project
and of the SPY ITEA2 European project, related to robust and
semi-fragile watermarking applications, respectively.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 details
the state of the art on compressed domain video water-
marking (both robust and semi-fragile). Section 3 presents
the advanced m-QIM theoretical framework. Sections 4 and
5 are devoted to the applicative validation for robust and
semi-fragile watermarking, respectively. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper and discusses the future work directions.
2. State of the art
Current days, a special attention in watermarking is
paid to the MPEG-4 Part 10 (a.k.a. MPEG-4 AVC or,
alternatively H.264) [5] compressed stream. As its ances-
tors, this standard contains four basic functions: predic-
tion, transformation, quantization and entropic encoding,
denoted in Fig. 3 by P, T, Q and E, respectively. In order to
achieve higher compression efficiency, MPEG-4 AVC
deploys particular compression features such as variable
block-size motion estimation, directional spatial predic-
tion, DCT (discrete cosine transform) approximation and
context-adaptive entropic encoding. Consequently, the
watermarking techniques devoted to uncompressed or to
earlier compressed domains (MPEG-2 or MPEG-4 Part 2)
are likely to fail in reaching the same performances in the
MPEG-4 AVC domain and specific methods should be
devised in this respect, [4,6–16]. Such different studies
cover issues related to both robust [4,6–8] and semi-fragile
watermarking systems [9–16]; they are benchmarked in
Tables 1 and 2. Note that two methods reported in the
literature as robust [14,16] can be considered, at least from
their properties point of view, as semi-fragile.
2.1. Robust watermarking
Golikeri et al. [6] advance a binary QIM (quantization index
modulation) watermarking method applied to MPEG-4 AVCFig. 3. Encoding/decoding chain andDCT coefficients. The watermark is inserted into the percep-
tual projection (according to a psycho visual mask) of the
selected block. Although it is transparent (a value of
PSNR¼32.4 dB) and robust against transcoding and filtering,
this method does not meet either the robustness to geo-
metrics attacks or the real time constraints.
In [7], Noorkami et al. present a method devoted to the
MPEG-4 AVC stream but performed during the encoding
step (hence, the uncompressed data should be available
during the insertion). The watermark, a bipolar message, is
inserted into the quantized AC coefficients, selected
according to a perceptual cost. When compared to the
method in [6], this technique increases the data payload to
160 bit/min while keeping the same transparency. The
experiments show robustness against linear filtering, fra-
gility to geometrical attacks and does not consider trans-
coding. The watermark insertion during the encoding
process makes this method computationally complex.
Zou et al. [8] tackle the issue of watermarking the
MPEG-4 AVC stream by a substitution method applied at
the stream level. This study demonstrates that such a
controlled modification of the stream elements is possible
while keeping a transparency expressed by a PSNR¼32 dB.
However, the paper does not evaluate the watermarking
system performances.
Belhaj et al. [4] introduce a binary ST-DM for MPEG-4
AVC streamwatermarking which combines QIM principles,
a new perceptual shaping mechanism devoted to the
MPEG-4 AVC syntax peculiarities, and an information-
theory driven selection criterion. This way, a transparency
expressed by a PSNR¼42 dB and a NCC¼0.99 is obtained.
The robustness was checked against transcoding and
random geometric attacks (BER lower than 10%). The data
payload is 279 bit/5 min of video.2.2. Semi-fragile watermarking
Xu and Wang [9] perform the watermarking at the
MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding level. In this respect, the
Exp-Golomb code elements which are eligible to be water-
marked without destroying the stream synchronization are
first detected. Then, a mapping rule between these elements
and the watermark bits is established. The detection is
performed by directly parsing the Exp-Golomb code words
of the watermarked stream. The performance evaluations
show perfect transparency (no quality degradation being
induced) but a total fragility to transcoding.related watermarking studies.
M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitrea / Signal Processing: Image Communication 29 (2014) 107–127110Kim et al. [10] embed the watermark bits in the motion
vectors of the inter blocks or in the intra mode number of
the intra blocks. The advanced method features a high data
payload with small image quality degradation (a
PSNR¼40 dB is reported). Nevertheless, a large sensitivity
to transcoding is featured.
Wang and Hsu [11] present a fragile watermarking
algorithm to authenticate MPEG-4 AVC stream. The mark
is computed as the MD5 (message digest algorithm) hash
function of a random generated binary sequence and
embedded by changing the parity of the high-frequency
quantized DCT coefficients of I frames. While such a
technique provides the ideal case of fragility and features
low complexity (only the MPEG-4 AVC entropic decoding
being required), it is conceptually unable to make any
distinction between mundane and malicious attacks.
Zang and Ho [12] adopt the same principles and insert
the mark in the P frames. The overall results show good
transparency (PSNR435 dB), a very good sensitivity toTable 2
State-of-the art MPEG-4 AVC semi-fragile methods (NA stands for not available
Method Fragility Robustne
Exponential-Golomb code word
mapping [9]
Sensitive to all
manipulations
Motion vector and macroblock mode LSB
embedding [10]
Sensitive to all
manipulations
Changing the parity of the last nonzero
coefficient [11]
Sensitive to all
manipulations
Modifying the nonzero quantized
coefficients [12]
Sensitive to all
manipulations
Imposing local intensity relations into a
group of adjacent blocks [13]
Temporal
alterations
Frame-le
(QF¼30)
Median f
Enforcing DCT coefficients relations [14] Sensitive to all
manipulations
Frame-le
(QF¼50)
Reactivating skipped macroblocks [15] Sensitive to all
manipulations
Modifying the number of quantized
nonzero AC coefficients [16]
Sensitive to all
manipulations
NA
Table 1
State-of-the art MPEG-4 AVC robust methods (NA stands for not available).
Method Fragility Robustness T
QIM [6] Geometric
Transcoding
P
Filtering
Additive mark embedding
Geometric Filtering N
Perceptual shaping [7]
Stream substitution[8] Geometric
Transcoding
P
Filtering
QIM
Transcoding
P
N
Filtering
Perceptual shaping [4] Geometricspatio-temporal alterations, low complexity but no robust-
ness to content preserving attacks (e.g. transcodage).
Chen and Leung present a semi-fragile watermarking
scheme based on chaotic systems for the authentication of
individual frames in the MPEG-4 AVC stream [13]. The
authentication information is represented by both the GOP
index and the frame index in that GOP. This information is
modulated in a chaotic signal and inserted in the DCT
transformed blocks of each frame by imposing local
intensity relationships into a group of adjacent blocks.
The insertion requires the entropic decoding, the de-
quantizing and the reverse of the prediction operations,
thus becoming computationally complex. Experiments
carried out on a 795 frames video sequence proved a
transparency expressed by a PSNR¼40 dB and robustness
against JPEG compression (quality factor QF of 30) and
median filtering. This method also detects the temporal
modifications (with one frame accuracy) but the spatial
modification properties were not assessed.).
ss Transparency Data payload Complexity
NA NA Binary stream
parsing
PSNR¼40 dB NA Entropic
decoding
NA NA Entropic
decoding
PSNR435 dB NA Entropic
decoding
vel JPEG PSNR¼40 dB NA Uncompres-
sed domain
iletring
vel JPEG NA NA Entropic
decoding
PSNR450 dB NA Entropic
decoding
NA NA Entropic
decoding
ransparency Data payload Complexity
SNR¼32.4 dB NA Entropic decoding
Dequantization
A 800 bit/5 min
Entropic decoding
Dequantization
SNR¼32 dB NA Binary stream parsing
SNR¼42 dB
CC¼0.99 279 bit/5 min Entropic decoding
Fig. 4. Decision regions for binary QIM.
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system devoted to the MPEG-1/2 video sequences. The
mark computation is based on the properties of the entropy
computed at the 88 block levels. The mark is embedded
by enforcing relationship between the DCT coefficients of
some blocks. The experiments are run on one sequence
(whose length is not précised) encoded at 1125 kbps. The
method proved both robustness (against JPEG compression
with QF¼50) and fragility against temporal (with 2 frame
accuracy) and spatial (with a non-assessed accuracy) con-
tent changing. However, the main drawback of this method
remains its inner computation complexity: beyond the
complete MPEG decoding/encoding, it also requires sophis-
ticated entropy estimation at frame levels.
Proforck et al. [15] propose an integrity authentication
schema of MPEG-4 AVC. The authentication information
which consists of the encrypted hash value and a certificate
with public key is embedded by reactivating some skipped
macroblocks. The advantage of the method is the possibility
of erasing the watermark, but the considered hash algo-
rithm increases the computation cost of the scheme. The
transparency was evaluated at a PSNR450 dB.
Chen et al. [16] compute the authentication data as the
block sub-index. Then, the obtained signature is
embedded by modifying the number of nonzero DCT AC
coefficients of I frames. The experimental results show that
the proposed system can detect the illegally altered area.
However, neither the transparency nor the robustness
against non malicious alteration has been evaluated.
Tables 1 and 2 show that the large variety of state of-
the-art methods allow each particular constraint (trans-
parency, robustness, data payload, computational cost) to
be individually reached for particular applications. How-
ever, none of these studies is able to jointly reach these
four requirements. For instance, for the robust watermark-
ing, the method in [4], based on binary QIM, seems to
provide the best robustness, transparency and computa-
tional trade off but leaves room for data payload improve-
ment. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no
watermarking method is able today to serve both the
purposes of robust and semi-fragile watermarking.
Our previous studies [17–19] represent some first steps
in this respect: they followed an application oriented
approach and brought to light the utility of m-QIM for
increasing the data payload with respect to the QIM
methods. These studies are resumed and extended in the
present paper. The m-QIM theoretical framework is first
advanced. Then, its performances are evaluated under the
frameworks of the MEDIEVALS French national project
(robust watermarking) and of the SPY ITEA2 European
project (semi-fragile watermarking).
3. m-QIM framework
3.1. Binary QIM
Consider the case in which some binary information
α¼ 0:84 is to be inserted in some (floating point) original
data Δ¼ 70 by means of binary QIM methods [6,4]. To do
so, x is quantized using multiple quantizers whose indexes
are chosen based on the message to be embedded [3].To implement such quantizers, dither modulation (DM)
can be used [3], thus obtaining the watermarked signal y:
q¼ QΔðxΔðb=2þkÞÞðxΔðb=2þkÞÞ
y¼ xþαq
(
ð1Þ
where Δ is a fixed quantization step size, k a random key
(sampled from a white, uniform noise, 0okr1) and α a
fixed parameter, 0oαr1.
The quantizer QΔ is defined as follows:
QΔðxÞ ¼ ΔRoundðx=ΔÞ ð2Þ
where RoundðÞ is the approximation to the closest integer.
The practical balance between the transparency and
the robustness can be reached by adjusting the α and Δ
parameters: the lower the α and Δ values, the lower the
difference between x and y and, consequently, the greater
the transparency but the worse the robustness.
At the decoder, the embedded message bits are recov-
ered by a scalar quantization of the received signal sample
r which represents the y signal after its corruption by
attacks.
The Y (b) decision variable is computed as follows [3,4]:
YðbÞ ¼QΔðrkΔÞrþkΔ ð3Þ
The aim is to decide whether the inserted bit was b¼ 0
or b¼ 1. The optimal decision rule, assuming the attacks
are modelled by additive white Gaussian noise is (see
Fig. 4) [3]:
jYðbÞjo ð1αÞΔ=2 - b^ ¼ 0
jYðbÞjZ ð1αÞ Δ=2- b^¼ 1
8<
: ð4Þ
3.2. Multiple-symbol QIM (m-QIM)
3.2.1. m-QIM insertion
In order to generalize the insertion technique, be there
the same binary message b to be inserted in the same
original data x.
Prior to its insertion, the message b is encoded into a
message d belonging to an m-ary alphabet D; assuming m
is an odd value
D¼ m1
2
; m2
2
; … 0; …m2
2
;
m1
2
 
:
On average, each d symbol corresponds to log 2m bits
from the message b [20].
By following the principles above, the m-QIM insertion
can be expressed as
q¼ QΔ xΔ dmþk
   xΔ dmþk  
y¼ xþαq
(
ð5Þ
M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitrea / Signal Processing: Image Communication 29 (2014) 107–127112as in the binary case, the lower the α and the Δ, the lower
the difference between x and y and the greater the
transparency but the worse the robustness. However, this
time, each x sample bears one d m-ary symbol, thus
increasing the data payload by a factor of log 2m, with
respect to the binary case.
3.2.2. m-QIM detection
While keeping practically the same insertion rule,
see (1) vs. (5), the multi-symbol generalisation requires
the modification of the decision rule. In the present
paper,
a decision rule minimising the probability error in mark
detection under the white additive Gaussian noise hypoth-
esis is derived.
Let us consider first the case in which no attack occurs.
The decision is based on the value of the YðdÞ variable
YðdÞ ¼QΔðxþαqkΔÞðxþαqkΔÞ ð6Þ
YðdÞ is a quantization error belonging to the Δ=2;Δ=2 
interval. Hence, specifying a decision rule means to divide
the decision region Δ=2;Δ=2  into m non-overlapping
intervals. These intervals are computed based on a three-
steps development presented below. First, the YðdÞ expres-
sion is reformulated so as to no longer depend on the
original data x. Second, the decision intervals are com-
puted by expressing the quantization error as a function of
α, d,m and Δ. Finally, the value of the α parameter ensuring
non-overlapping intervals is computed.
Step 1: YðdÞ reformulation.
We denote: A¼ xΔðd=mþkÞ and B¼ xþαqkΔ.
The expression of A as a function of B is obtained as
follows:
B¼ xþα QΔ xΔ dmþk
   xΔ dmþk   kΔ
¼ xþαQΔðAÞα xΔ dmþk
  kΔ
¼ ð1αÞðAQΔðAÞÞþQΔðAÞþΔdm ¼ ðα1ÞqþQΔðAÞþΔdm
ð7Þ
Then, YðdÞ can be written as follows:
YðdÞ ¼QΔðBðdÞÞBðdÞ
¼QΔ ðα1ÞqþQΔðAÞþΔdm
 ðα1ÞqQΔðAÞΔdm
as QΔ is by its definition a multiple of Δ, YðdÞ can be
simplified as follows:
YðdÞ ¼QΔ ðα1ÞqþΔdm
 ðα1ÞqΔdm
Let CðdÞ ¼ ðα1ÞqþΔd=m then
YðdÞ ¼QΔðCðdÞÞCðdÞ ð8Þ
Note that while (6) and (8) are equivalent from the
mathematical point of view, the right-hand term of (8)
does no longer depend on the original (unmarked) data x.
Step 2: Decision intervals as a function of α, d, m and Δ.
We have Δ=2oqoΔ=2 and 0oαr1; this implies
Δððα1Þmþ2dÞ=2moCðdÞoΔðð1αÞmþ2dÞ=2m ð9Þ
Be there
Isup;αðdÞ ¼ Δðð1αÞmþ2dÞ2m
Iinf ;αðdÞ ¼ Δððα1Þmþ2dÞ2m
8<
: ð10ÞFrom Eqs. (5) and (6) we obtain
Isup;αðdÞþQΔðCðdÞÞoYðdÞoIinf ;αðdÞþQΔðCðdÞÞ ð11Þ
QΔðCðdÞÞ is the quantized value of CðdÞ with quantization
step Δ; hence
QΔðCðdÞÞ ¼ lΔ; lAZ
l12
 
ΔrCðdÞo lþ12
 
Δ
(
ð12Þ
Eqs. (9) and (12) imply
ðð1αÞmþ2dÞ
2m o lþ1=2
ððα1Þmþ2dÞ
2m 4 l1=2
8<
: ð13Þ
as d is a symbol from the m-ary alphabet D, we have
jdjrðm1Þ=2
Hence, Eq. (13) gives
l
 o jðm1Þ=mαj
2
ð14Þ
then: l¼ 0 and consequently QΔðCðdÞÞ ¼ 0. According to
(10) we get
Isup;αðdÞrYðdÞrIinf ;αðdÞ ð15Þ
Eq. (15) demonstrates that the insertion of the d
symbol results in YðdÞ values belonging to the
½ Isup;α dð Þ Iinf ;α dð Þ  interval. IαðdÞ depends on Δ, α, and
m: while Δ and m are fixed for an application, α is a
parameter which can be chosen so as to ensure non-
overleaping decision intervals.
Step 3: Computing the optimal α value.
For a fixed value of α parameter, Isup;α and Iinf ;α defined
in Eq. (10) are positive slope affine functions, i.e. increasing
functions of d. Hence, if each two successive symbols (d,
dþ1) have non-overlapping decision intervals, then we
will have m non-overlapping decision intervals
Isup;αðdÞIinf ;αðdþ1Þr0
This yields to
Δ
	
ðα1Þmþ2d


2m

Δ
	
ð1αÞmþ2ðdþ1Þ


2m
r0 ð16Þ
Eq. (16) implies that the condition for obtaining non-
overleaping IαðdÞ intervals is αZ ðm1Þ=m; be αn ¼
ðm1Þ=m. The influence of α on the IαðdÞ intervals is
illustrated in Fig. 5 for m¼ 5 (hence, αn ¼ 0:8) and Δ¼ 70.
Three particular cases are considered, namely α¼ 0:76oαn
(see Fig. 5 up-left), α¼ 0:8¼ αn (see Fig. 5 up-right) and
α¼ 0:844αn (see Fig. 5 bottom). In these three plots, the
abscissa corresponds to the value of d, while the ordinate
stands for the Iinf ; α (in blue diamond) and Isup;α (in red
square).
The αn can be considered as the optimal α value for
computing the decision intervals: it ensures non-
overlapping intervals (hence ideal robustness, assuming
no attack occurs) and the best transparency (the minimal
differences between the host and the marked signals).
Consequently, the optimal decision rule associates to
each inserted d symbol a detection interval Iαn ðdÞ ¼
½Isup;αn ðdÞ Iinf ;αn ðdÞ . In other words, when a particular
YðdÞ value is computed at the watermarking detection side,
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
Iinf
Isup
3 2 1 0 1 2 3
Iinf
Isup
Fig. 5. Isup;α and Iinf ;α as a function of d, illustrated for m¼ 5; Δ¼ 70 and three values of α: α¼ 0:76oαn (up-left), α¼ 0:8¼ αn (up-right) and α¼ 0:844αn
(bottom). The grid represents the axis unit (equal horizontal/vertical values).
101010 10 22
Fig. 6. Decision regions for m¼5, Δ¼70 and α¼ 0:844αn ¼ 0:8.
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if YðdÞA Iαn ðd^Þ ¼4d¼ d^ ð17Þ
Assume now the case in which the attacks are present:
the insertion of a d symbol can result now in a value YðdÞ
outside the Iαn interval. Intuitively, in order to decrease the
errors induced by such a situation, a value α4αn should be
considered at insertion/detection, i.e. a lower transparency
should be accepted in order to grant some additional
robustness against attacks, see Fig. 5. The Iαn and Iα
obtained for m¼5 (hence αn ¼ 0:84), α¼ 0:84 and Δ¼ 70
are illustrated in Fig. 6.
As usual in the watermarking studies [21], we s
hall assume that the attacks are independent with respect
to the inserted symbol and that they can be modelled by awhite, Gaussian noise which is added to the YðdÞ
value computed for a fixed α4αn parameter;
the ~Y ðdÞ variable becomes
~Y ðdÞ ¼ YðdÞþn
~Y ðdÞ can fall between two IαðdÞ decision regions or even
outside the Δ2; Δ2
 
interval. Consequently, the optimal
Fig. 7. Received signal distribution: illustration for m¼5, Δ¼70 and
α¼ 0:84.
Table 3
Detection matrix.
detected symbol
-2 -1 0 1 2 
in
se
rt
ed
 sy
m
bo
l -2 C E E E E
-1 E C E E E
0 E E C E E
1 E E E C E 
2 E E E E C 
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extended so as to cope with such a situation, as follows.
First, although the insertion is performed for an α4αn
value, the decision regions will be computed on the Iαn
basis: this way, all the values inside the Δ2; Δ2
 
are
considered. Moreover, in order to avoid the cases in which
~Y ðdÞ would fall outside the Δ2; Δ2
 
interval, a modulo
operator is applied prior to the detection. The correspond-
ing decision variable ~Y ΔðdÞ and the underlying decision
rule are
~Y ΔðdÞ ¼ ~Y ðdÞmodulo ΔΔ2
if ~Y ΔðdÞA Iαn ðd^Þ ¼4d¼ d^ ð18Þ
The error probability associated to the decision rule in
Eq. (18) and its optimality are discussed in the following
section.
3.3. Probability of error at the detection
3.3.1. Computing the probability density functions for
decision variables
In the sequel, we shall incrementally express the
probability density function for the YðdÞ, ~Y ðdÞ and ~Y ΔðdÞ
decision variables.
The YðdÞ variable is computed as the result of a
quantization error and belongs to the IαðdÞ ¼
½Isup;αðdÞ  Iinf ;αðdÞ  intervals, cf. (6) and (17). Conse-
quently, the probability density function of the Yð:Þ vari-
able conditioned on the insertion of the Δ¼ 90 symbol is
denoted by pY ðu=dÞ and can be modelled by a uniform law
in that interval [20]:
pY ðu=dÞ ¼
1
1αð ÞΔ; ifuA IαðdÞ;
0; if not
(
The noise probability density function, denoted by
pnðnÞ, is assumed to follow a normal (Gaussian) law of
μ¼ 0 mean and s standard deviation
pnðnÞ ¼
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2π
p
s
en
2=2s2
As ~Y ðdÞ ¼ YðdÞþn, its probability density function con-
ditioned on the insertion of the d symbol can be expressed
as the convolution between the pY ðy=dÞ and pnðnÞ
p ~Y ðy=dÞ ¼ ðpY ðu=dÞ  pnðnÞÞðyÞ ¼
1
ð1αÞΔ
Z  Iinf ;αðdÞ
Isup;αðdÞ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2π
p
s
eðytÞ
2=2s2dt
Thus, p ~Y ðy=dÞ can be expressed by using the erfc
function
p ~Y ðy=dÞ ¼
1
2ð1αÞΔ erfc 
Isup;αðdÞþyﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
s
 
erfc Iinf ;αðdÞþyﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
s
  
ð19Þ
where erfcðU Þ is the complementary error function func-
tion defined by
erfcðxÞ ¼ 2ﬃﬃﬃ
π
p
Z 1
x
et
2
dt
As ~Y ΔðdÞ ¼ ~Y ðdÞmodulo ΔΔ=2 , its conditional prob-
ability on the insertion of the d symbol was computed in
our study from the p ~Y ðy=dÞ, by following basic principles innon-linear random variable filtering:
p ~Y Δ ðy=dÞ ¼∑
i
p ~Y
iΔ
2
þy
 
=d
 
; i¼ 2jþ1; jAZ ð20Þ
Eqs. (19) and (20) show that irrespective to the d symbol,
p ~Y Δ ðy=dÞ has a maximal value corresponding the centre of
the IαðdÞ and symmetrically decreases from that point, as
illustrated in Fig. 7 for m¼ 5, Δ ¼ 70 and α¼ 0:84.3.3.2. The optimal decision rule
In its widest acceptation, specifying a decision rule
means to define a partition of the interval in which the
detection variable takes values [21]. In the m-QIM case,
this means to define a partition Δi, iAf0;1;…;m1g of the
½Δ=2; Δ=2 interval
UiΔi ¼ ½Δ=2; Δ=2 and \ iΔi ¼∅ ð21Þ
Consider now the case in which a symbol di is inserted.
A correct decision is made when the ~Y ΔðdiÞ variable
belongs to the Δi interval. On the contrarily, an error
occurs when the attacks act in such a way that the ~Y ΔðdiÞ
variable belongs to a Δj, with ia j; i; jAf0; 1; …; m1g.
Table 3 illustrates the correct/erred decisions for m¼ 5:
the rows correspond to the inserted symbols, while the
columns to the decision; C stands for a correct decision
while E stands for an erred decision.
The probability of the correct decision when inserting
the di symbol is denoted by Pcðdi) and can be computed
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PcðdiÞ ¼
Z
Δi
p ~Y Δ ðy=diÞdy ð22Þ
The average probability of a correct decision is denoted
by Pc and can be computed by averaging the PcðdiÞ values
Pc ¼∑
di
PðdiÞPcðdiÞ ð23Þ
The optimal detection rule should ensure the maximal Pc
value over all possible Δi partitions of the ½Δ=2; Δ=2
interval.
For watermarking applications, the inserted symbols
are equally likely: PðdiÞ ¼ PðdjÞ, i; jAf0;1;…;m1g. Hence,
at the detection side, the probabilities of correct detection
of the inserted symbols should also be equal
PcðdiÞ ¼ PcðdjÞ; i; jAf0;1;…;m1g ð24Þ
Eqs. (22) and (24) yield toZ
Δi
p ~Y Δ ðy=diÞdy¼
Z
Δj
p ~Y Δ ðy=djÞdy ð25Þ
where i; jAf0;1;…;m1g.
Eq. (25) demonstrates that the optimal decision rule
should ensure at the same time maximal and equalR
Δi
p ~Y Δ ðy=diÞdy values over all possible Δi partitions.
When coming now back to the expression of p ~Y Δ ðy=dÞ,
see Eq. (20), it can be stated that:(1) equal values for the left and right side expressions in
(25) can be obtained when the Δi intervals have the
same length (i.e. a fifth of the Δ value;(2) for a given length of a decision interval Δi,
iAf0;1;…;m1g, a maximal value for R Δi p ~Y Δ ðy=diÞdy is
obtained when p ~Y Δ ðy=diÞ is centred within the Δi interval.The two observations above demonstrate that the
decision rule in (18) is an optimal decision rule, in the
sense of maximizing the probability of correct decision,
hence of minimizing the probability of error.
3.3.3. Computing the probability of error
Assume now the case in which a di symbol is inserted
and a wrong decision dj ðdjadiÞ is made. The probability of
such an error, denoted by Peðdi; djÞ, can be computed as
Peðdi; djÞ ¼ PðdiÞ
Z
Iαn ðdjÞ
p ~Y Δ ðy=diÞdy
The average error probability, when considering all the
possible symbols to be inserted and all the possible errors in
detection can be computed as the sum of the individual error
probabilities
Pe ¼ ∑
di; dj
diadj
Peðdi; djÞ; i; jAf0;1;…;m1g ð26Þ
The error probability expressed by Eq. (26) corresponds
to the error in detecting a symbol d from an m-ary
alphabet. Should we be interested in the error of detecting
a symbol from the initial binary message b, the generalconversion formula can be applied [22,23]
Peb ¼
1
2
m
m1Pe ð27Þ
Fig. 8 illustrates the average probability error expressed
by Eq. (26) as a function of the Gaussian noise standard
deviation s (presented on the abscissa), for Δ ¼ 70. Four
alphabet sizes have been considered, namely m¼ 2, m¼ 3,
m¼ 5 and m¼ 7. In each case, 11 values for the α
parameter are illustrated; these values are evenly distrib-
uted with a step 0.02 and are centered on the correspond-
ing αn value; the case of αn is plotted in red.
By analyzing these plots, the following conclusions are
brought to light: when αoαn, Pe40 even in the absence of attacks (i.e.
even when s¼ 0); this is a consequence of the over-
lapping between the decision intervals, see Fig. 5; when α¼ αn and in the absence of attacks (i.e. s¼ 0),
Pe ¼ 0; this result derives from the fact that in the
absence of attacks, the decision rule in (17) is determi-
nistic and α¼ αn ensures the best robustness–transpar-
ency trade-off; if α¼ αn and s40, then Pe40; consequently, the αn
value ensuring the best transparency cannot be
exploited in practical applications: in order to grant
some robustness to the attacks, an α4αn should be
considered, thus impacting in the transparency; if the practical application requires a value Peo0:1 for
soΔ =ð4mÞ (i.e. for a Gaussian noise covering at 95% a
particular decision interval Iαn ðdÞ, see Fig. 9), then
values αZαnþ0:04 should be considered. This lower
limit α¼ αnþ0:04 will be further considered for the
theoretical investigation of the Pe variation as a func-
tion of Δ (see Fig. 10) and for the experimental valida-
tions in Sections 4 and 5; all the Pe plots converge towards ðm1Þ=m, when
s-Δ=2 (i.e. in the case of a very strong Gaussian noise,
covering practically all the Δ2; Δ2
 
interval), see Fig. 9.
Fig. 10 illustrates the average probability error
expressed by Eq. (26) as a function of the Gaussian noise
standard deviation s (represented on the abscissa), for
α¼ αnþ0:04; the same four values for m have been
investigated: m¼2, m¼3, m¼5 and m¼7 . In each case,
seven Δ values are illustrated, namely Δ¼40 , Δ¼50,
Δ¼60, Δ¼70, Δ¼80, Δ¼90, and Δ¼100. By analyzing
these plots, we can see that Pe is a decreasing function of
Δ, at a fixed value of s . Hence, the increase of Δ means a
priori a stronger robustness, obtained at the expense of a
weaker transparency. In the sequel, we shall consider Δ
values between 50 and 90 and we shall discuss their
practical relevance.
3.4. Conclusion
This section presents the theoretical framework for the
m-QIM watermarking. First, it generalizes the insertion rule,
from the binary to m-ary case, see Eq. (5). Second, it derives
the optimal decision rule in the sense of minimizing the
Fig. 9. Gaussian noise for s¼ Δ=4m (i.e. a noise covering only one
decision interval) and for s¼ Δ=2 (i.e. a very strong noise, covering all the
Δ2; Δ2
 
interval).
Fig. 8. Pe as a function of s , for 11 values of α , for four values of m (m¼2, m¼3, m¼5 and , m¼7) and for a fixed value Δ¼70.
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Gaussian noise (18) and computes the underlying prob-
ability error (26). These results also identify optimal (in theerror probability sense) parameters for the method and/or
hinted to more suitable configurations to be considered in
the practical validation. The way in which these theoretical
issues are reflected in the practical data payload–transpar-
ency–robustness tradeoff is investigated in next section for
robust and semi-fragile applications.4. Robust watermarking validation
The robust watermarking embedding process starts by
following the principles in [17,18]. The mark is inserted in
the quantized AC luma residual coefficients; this way, the
MPEG-4 AVC decoding/reenconding overhead is limited to
the binary decoding/reencoding.
The host vector x is obtained by zig-zag scanning the 15
components of a 4 4 AC luma residual coefficients.
In order to match the watermarking method to the
human visual system, a perceptual shaping mechanism is
also considered. This means that the watermark is not
directly embedded into the original vector x but into its
projection onto a perceptual mask vmask. This mask is
obtained by adapting and extending [4] for MPEG-4 AVC
the popular Watson model [24] developed for still images.
Fig. 10. Pe as a function of s , for ΔA 40;50;60;70;80;90;100f g , mAf2; 3; 5; 7g and α¼ αnþ0:04.
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details in this respect can be found in [17,18].
The m-QIM parameters are chosen so as to serve the
practical purpose of the robust watermarking application
and are guided by the theoretical demonstration in Section
3. Four m values and three quantization steps Δ are
compared all through the study, namely mAf2; 3; 5; 7g
and ΔAf50; 70; 90g.
Regardless the particular m and Δ values, we set
α¼ αnþ0:04 (see the discussion in Section 3.3.2).
Experimental evaluations are carried under MEDIE-
VALS corpus consisting of 4 video sequences of 15 min
each. They were encoded in MPEG-4 AVC Baseline Profile
(no B frames, CAVLC entropy encoder) at 512 kb/s (SD) and
2 Mbps (HD). The GOP size is set to 10.
The experiments are conducted at three successive
levels, so as to investigate the three-folded data payload–
robustness–transparency watermarking challenge.
First (Section 4.1), the data payload is estimated for
different m values while keeping fixed values for transpar-
ency (average PSNR of 45 dB and of 65 dB, for SD and HD,
respectively) and robustness (maximal BER of 0.170.03
against bipolar additive noise, transcoding and geometric
random bending attacks).Second (Section 4.2), the robustness against the same
three types of attacks is investigated at fixed data payload
(150 bit/min) and transparency (PSNR of 45 dB and of
65 dB, for SD and HD, respectively) constraints.
Finally (Section 4.3), the transparency (expressed by
five subjective metrics) is assessed at fixed data payload
(150 bit/min) and robustness (maximal BER of 0.170.03
against additive noise, transcoding and geometric random
bending attacks).
4.1. Data payload
As the m-QIM is intrinsically a side-information
method [3,21] the data payload depends on the particular
video sequence and cannot be a priori predicted.
Consequently, our experiments consider for each value
m an incremental approach: we start from the value
reported in [4] for m¼ 2 and SD (namely 56 bit/min), and
we gradually increase it up to the limit allowing prescribed
average values for transparency and robustness. On the one
hand, the average transparency is set at a PSNR¼45 dB in
the SD case and at a PSNR¼65 dB in the HD case (with
minimal/maximal limits of 43/47 dB and 63/67 dB, respec-
tively). On the other hand, for both the SD and the HD
050
100
150
200
250
300
350
2 3 5 7 2 3 5 7
Datapayload (bits/minutes) Theoretical datapayload
Fig. 11. Data payload as a function of m, for Δ¼70 and for SD (left) and HD (right) content. Fixed transparency and robustness constraints are kept.
Table 4
Data payload behavior as function of Δ, the relative gain are computed according to (28).
SD HD
Δ 50 70 90 50 70 90
Data payload (per minute) 165 150 139 225 222 198
Relative gain ρ 0.10 0 0.13 0.07 0 0.11
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minimal/maximal limits of 0.07/0.13) after noise addition,
transcoding and geometric random bending attacks1. A
Δ¼ 70 has been considered. The values thus obtained for
the data payload are plotted in Fig. 11 in blue diamonds.
However, with respect to the binary QIM, the m-QIM
insertion is theoretically expected to increase the data
payload by a factor of log 2m [20]. Consequently, we
consider the data payload value obtained for m¼ 2 and
we also plot the corresponding theoretical logarithmic
function, see the red squares in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11 shows a good concordance between the theore-
tical and the experimental plot, the relative average differ-
ences being lower than 0.02 in the SD case and lower than
0.06 in the HD case. These average differences are com-
puted by averaging the relative differences obtained on the
corresponding corpora, for all the considered m values.
The experiments reported in Fig. 11 are resumed, in
Table 4, for α¼ αnþ0:04, for m¼ 5 but for two different Δ
values, namely Δ¼ 50 and Δ¼ 70. With respect to the
reference case Δ¼70, when keeping the same transpar-
ency/robustness constraints, it can be noticed that:Stir
maΔ¼ 50 ensures relative increases of the data payload by
factor of 0.1 and 0.07 in the SD and HD cases, respectively. Δ¼ 90 ensures relative decreases of the data payload by
factor of 0.13 and 0.11 in the SD and HD cases, respectively.
The relative gain ρ represented in the paragraph above
is computed according to the formula:
ρ¼ valueðtested ΔÞvalueðΔ¼ 70Þ
value ðΔ¼ 70Þ ð28Þ1 All through the paper the geometric attack is ensured by the
mark random bending [31]; the terms random geometric and Stir-
rk attacks will be alternatively employed.4.2. Robustness
While the theoretical demonstration presented in
Section 3.3 considered the case of the attacks modelled
by additive white Gaussian noise, the present section goes
outside this hypothesis, by experimentally investigating
attacks which cannot be modelled by the Gaussian laws
[25]: bipolar 1/1 white noise added in the 4 4 MPEG-4
AVC coefficient domain, MPEG-4 AVC transcoding (down
to 25% from the original stream bit rate) and geometric
random bending attacks.
The data payload is set at 150 bit/min while the
transparency is set at 45 dB (with 7 2 dB maximal varia-
tion) in the SD case and at 65 dB (with 7 2 dB maximal
variation) in the HD case. The Δ parameter is set at Δ¼ 70.
The same four values for m are investigated:
mAf2; 3; 5; 7g.
The robustness is investigated by computing the BER,
see Fig. 12: the case of bipolar additive noise is represented
in blue diamonds, the case of transcoding in red squares
while the random geometric attacks in green triangles. The
values reported in Fig. 12 are obtained by averaging the
BER obtained at the frame level. The following conclusions
can be drawn: the 1/1 bipolar noise addition results in perturbations
described by a unitary standard deviation; as this value
is very small compared to the Δ (see discussion in
Section 3.3.2), the choice of α¼ αnþ0:04 ensured a
BER¼0, although the law of such perturbation is not
Gaussian; the MPEG-4 AVC transcoding resulted in average2 BER
of 0.05 and 0.06, for the SD and HD content, respec-
tively; it can be noticed that BER is quite constant with
respect to m, the corresponding variances (over the2 Averaged over the four considered m values.
0
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additive bipolar noise
transcoding
Stirmark random bending
Fig. 12. BER as a function of m, for SD (left) and HD (right) content. Fixed data payload and transparency performances are kept, Δ¼ 70.
Original Additive noise Transcoding Stirmark
Fig. 13. The original ARTEMIS logo (left) and reconstructed ARTEMIS logo after additive noise, transcoding and geometric random bending attacks,
respectively.
Table 5
Robustness behavior as function of Δ, m¼ 5.
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1.7104, respectively;
SD HD
Δ 50 70 90 50 70 90
Transcoding (BER) 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.05
Relative gain ρ 0.50 0 0.33 0.28 0 0.28
Stirmark (BER) 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09
Relative gain (ρÞ 0.27 0 0.09 0.2 0 0.1the standard deviation of the noise induced by the
transcoding attacks is estimated in our experiments at
3.2 and 2.8, for SD and HD, respectively; the theoretical
error obtained by Eq. (27) for these sigma values are
0.07 and 0.06; while a slight difference between
the practice and the theory is identified in the SD case
(0.05 vs. 0.07), the two values are identical in the
HD case; the geometric random bending attacks also result in
quite constant averaged BER as a function of m: average
values of 0.105 and 0.090 and variances of 5.7104
and 4.4104 are obtained for the SD and HD content,
respectively; the standard deviation of the noise corresponding to
these attacks is estimated at 5.3 and 4.5, respectively;
the theoretical average error computed with (27) are
0.12 and 0.11; we can see a lower concordance between
the theoretical and experimental results than in the
case of transcoding; this is the consequence of the fact
that the geometrical attacks do not follow a
Gaussian law; the numerical values reported in this section are
statistical relevant, in the sense that the 95% confidence
intervals [26] computed for the BER after the transcod-
ing and the random bending attacks resulted in relative
errors lower than 5103 (the BER in the bipolar noiseaddition was constantly equal to 0; hence, no confi-
dence interval has been computed).The overall BER results prove the robustness of the m-
QIM watermarking method against the investigated
attacks. In order to illustrate the practical impact of these
attacks for SD content, Fig. 13 presents the case in which
the ARTEMIS logo is considered as the mark. The experi-
ments in Fig. 13 considered the same context as above: a
data payload of 150 bit/min, α¼ αnþ0:04, Δ¼70.
The experiments reported in Fig. 12 are resumed in
Table 5 for the same α¼ αnþ0:04, for m¼ 5 but for two
different Δ values, namely Δ¼ 50 and Δ¼ 90. With respect
to the case Δ¼70, when keeping the same data payload/
M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitrea / Signal Processing: Image Communication 29 (2014) 107–127120transparency constraints, it can be noticed that: Δ¼ 50 ensures relative increases of the BER by a factor
of 0.5 and 0.27 for transcoding and Stirmark random
bending, respectively in the SD case and by a factor of
0.28 and 0.2 for transcoding and Stirmark random
bending, respectively in the HD case. Δ¼ 90 results in relative decreases of the BER by a
factor of 0.33 and 0.09 for transcoding and Stirmark
random bending, respectively in the SD case and by a
factor of 0.28 and 0.1 for transcoding and Stirmark
random bending, respectively in the HD case.
Note: the relative increases/decreases in the BER are
computed according to (28).
4.3. Transparency
In order to evaluate the transparency of the water-
marking method, three types of metrics have been con-
sidered: pixel difference-based measures (peak signal to
noise ratio – PSNR and absolute average difference – AAD),
correlation based measures (structural continent – SC and
normalized cross correlation – NCC), and psycho-visualPSNR (dB)
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Fig. 14. PSNR and AAD as a function of m (Δ¼ 70)
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Fig. 15. SC and NCC as a function of m (Δ¼ 70):measures (digital video quality – DVQ). These metrics are
computed at the frame level according to their definitions
presented [27,28], then averaged over the video corpus, as
follows. Be there S and S^ two video to be compared, each of
them having Nf frames ofW  H pixels. Be Si;j;k the pixel at
column i and row j of frame k. PSNR, AAD, SC and NNC are
expressed by
PSNRðS; S^Þ ¼ 1
Nf
∑
Nf
k ¼ 1
10 log
W  H maxðSi;j;k2Þ
∑Wi ¼ 1∑
H
j ¼ 1ðSi;j;kS^i;j;kÞ2
0
@
1
A
AADðS; S^Þ ¼ 1
Nf
∑
Nf
k ¼ 1
∑Wi ¼ 1∑
H
j ¼ 1jSi;j;kS^i;j;kj
W  H
SCðS; S^Þ ¼ 1
Nf
∑
Nf
k ¼ 1
∑Wi ¼ 1∑
H
j ¼ 1ðSi;j;k2Þ
∑Wi ¼ 1∑
H
j ¼ 1ðS^i;j;k
2Þ
NNCðS; S^Þ ¼ 1
Nf
∑
Nf
k ¼ 1
∑Wi ¼ 1∑
H
j ¼ 1ðSi;j;k  S^i;j;kÞ
∑Wi ¼ 1∑
H
j ¼ 1ðSi;j;k2Þ
As the DVQ analytic computing is very sophisticated,
the reader is referred to [28].
A fixed data payload of 150 bit/min and robustness
(expressed by average maximal BER of 0.170.03 against
the three above-mentioned attacks) are considered.AAD (x10-3)
HDSD
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average values and 95% confidence limits.
M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitrea / Signal Processing: Image Communication 29 (2014) 107–127 121Figs. 14 to 16 display the average values of these
metrics alongside with their 95% confidence intervals [29].
As an overall trend, we can see that the transparency
improves with increasing the alphabet size m. This can be
explained by the fact that, for a fixed data payload, increasing
m decreases the number of MPEG-4 AVC blocks needed for
embedding the mark and thus reduces the drift artifacts
inner to compressed domain watermarking. However, an in-
depth analysis of the different variations of the quality
metrics, with respect to m, brings to light that the variation
of the quality metrics is stronger in the case of SD content
than in the case of HD content. In order to objectively assesTable 7
Transparency behavior as function of Δ, m¼ 5.
SD
Δ 50 70 90
PSNR 62 59 54
Relative gain (ρÞ 0.06 0 0.07
AAD 0.38 0.47 0.61
Relative gain (ρÞ 0.23 0 0.28
SC 0.98 0.97 0.96
Relative gain (ρÞ 0.01 0 0.02
NCC 0.99 0.98 0.96
Relative gain (ρÞ 0.01 0 0.02
DVQ 0.04 0.05 0.07
Relative gain (ρÞ 0.20 0 0.4
Table 6
Variation of the quality metric with respect to m.
SD
PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ
η 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.06 0.23
DVQ
SD HD
0.00
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0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
2 3 5 7 2 3 5 7
Fig. 16. DVQ as a function of m (Δ¼ 70): average values and 95%
confidence limits.this behavior, we consider the average relative variation
between two successive m values, denoted by η:
η¼ 1
3
∑
3
i ¼ 1
metricðmiþ1ÞmetricðmiÞ
metricðmiÞ
ð29Þ
where metric A {PSNR, AAD, SC, NCC and DVQ} and i is the
index of the deployed m value belonging to the set
f2; 3; 5; 7g. The η values are presented in Table 6.
The experiments reported in Figs. 14 to 16 are resumed
in Table 7 for the same α¼ αnþ0:04, for m¼ 5 and for two
different Δ values, namely Δ¼ 50 and Δ¼ 70. With respect
to the case Δ¼70, when keeping the same data payload/
robustness constraints, we note that Δ¼ 50 ensures: Relative increases by a factor of 0.06 and 0.04 for PSNR
in the SD case and HD case, respectively. Relative decreases by a factor 0.2 and 0.33 for DVQ, in
the SD case and in the HD case, respectively.Similarly, with respect to the case Δ¼70, when keeping
the same data payload/robustness constraints, we note
that Δ¼ 90 ensures: Relative decreases by a factor of 0.07 and 0.06 for PSNR,
in the SD case and in the HD case, respectively. Relative increases by a factor of 0.4 and 0.33 for DVQ in
the SD case and in the HD case, respectively.The relative gains are computed according to (28).HD
50 70 90
67 65 61
0.04 0 0.06
0.018 0.021 0.026
0.18 0 0.23
0.99 0.99 0.98
0.01 0 0.01
0.99 0.99 0.99
0.00 0 0.00
0.02 0.03 0.04
0.33 0 0.33
HD
PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ
0.012 0.21 0 0 0.16
Original Additive noise Transcoding Stirmark 
Fig. 17. The original ARTEMIS logo (left) and reconstructed ARTEMIS logo after additive noise, transcoding and geometric random bending attacks,
respectively. These experiments correspond to the method in [6].
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This section stands for the applicative validation of the
m-QIM insertion/detection under the framework of the
robust watermarking. The experimental investigation was
conducted at three levels and considered α¼ αnþ0:4
(according to the a priori hints discussed in Section 3.3).
First, for fixed transparency and robustness, an overall
log 2m gain in data payload has been obtained with respects
to the study in [4] where m¼ 2 was considered.
Second, for fixed data payload and transparency con-
straints, no practical loss in robustness has been encountered,
the variance of the BER with respect to m value being lower
than 6104; such a result holds for both SD and HD corpora.
Finally, an average relative increase by a factor of 0.1
and 0.01 of PSNR and an average relative decrease by a
factor of 0.23 and 0.16 of DVQ are obtained for fixed data
payload and robustness in the SD case and HD case,
respectively; the correlation based measures are quite
constant with respect to m. This slight increase in trans-
parency is the consequence of the decrease of the number
of MPEG-4 AVC blocks needed for embedding when the
alphabet size is increased and of the subsequent drift
effect attenuation.
The experiments also investigated the impact of the Δ
parameter in the overall results (the larger the Δ, the
better the robustness but the worse the transparency).
They also brought to light that a quite large interval of Δ
values (from 50 to 90) can be considered for robust
watermarking purposes.
In order to allow an overall comparison between our m-
QIM framework and state-of-the-art binary QIM approaches,
we also implemented the method in [6]. We resumed the
experiments presented in this Section 4 while keeping the
data payload–robustness–transparency constraints the same.
The data payload experiments (cf. Section 4.1) demon-
strated that the method in [6] cannot allow even 1 bit/s to
be inserted.
The robustness experiments (cf. Section 4.2) brought to
light that the QIM method in [6] resulted in: BER¼0, after additive noise (for both SD and HD
original content); BER¼0.17 and 0.15 after transcoding attacks, for SD and
HD content, respectively; the underlying 95% relative
errors were 0.02 and 0.019, respectively; these BER
values are about 3 times larger than the average values
corresponding to the m-QIM. BER¼0.45 and 0.43 after the Stirmark random bending
attack, for SD and HD content, respectively; the under-
lying 95% relative errors were 0.025; these BER values
are about 4 times larger than the average values
corresponding to the m-QIM.A synoptic view on these robustness results is provided
by Fig. 17 which is analogous to Fig. 13. It illustrates the
ARTEMIS logo recovered by using the method in [6], after
bipolar additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark random
bending attacks. It can be noticed that the Stirmark
random bending attacks completely destroy the meaning
of the recovered logo.
As the method in [6] cannot provide the expected data
payload and robustness constraints, the transparency
experiments in Section 4.3 were not resumed.5. Semi-fragile watermarking validation
5.1. Semi-fragile watermarking method peculiarity
The practical use of m-QIM for semi-fragile watermarking
was first discussed in [19]. While the same insertion/detection
rule as in the case of robust watermarking is basically kept the
semi-fragile watermarking application comes with particular
constraints on (1) the mark semantics, (2) the data payload,
and (3) the result interpretation.
First, from the semantic point of view, the mark no
longer relates to the intellectual property rights informa-
tion but to an authentication signature of the content
itself. The low complexity requirement can be met when
such a signature is extracted and inserted directly from/in
the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements, with minimal decoding/
re-encoding operations. To meet this requirement, we
consider individual groups of i successive I frames (further
referred to as I-Group) sampled from an MPEG-4 AVC
video sequence, see Fig. 18. The signature is computed
from the first frame I0 in such an I-Group, by assigning one
bit to each macroblock, according to its prediction mode.
Further, the binary signature is encoded to on a m-ary
alphabet. This principle explained at the frame level, can
be applied at a finer level, i.e. on given area covering
neighbor macroblocks. The smaller the area on which the
signature is computed, the more accurate the spatial
identification of the content modified regions.
The signature conveying information about the content
of the first I frame is further inserted into the rest of i1 I
frames of that I-Group by the m-QIM embedding method,
see Eq. (6). The shorter the I-Group, the more accurate the
temporal localization of the altered content.
In order to verify the integrity of an attacked I-Group (see
Fig. 18), the authentication signature of the attacked video is
computed from its first I0 frame. This signature is compared
with the mark extracted from the rest of the attacked I-Group
frames. In our experiments, we consider that an area in a
frame is altered when at least 50% of the attacked signature
elements belonging to that area do not match with the
corresponding extracted watermark elements.
Fig. 18. Semi-fragile watermarking system.
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authentication signature results in about 4.5 kbit/min
(assuming SD corpus with frame size of 640480). As
such a data payload is 30 times larger than the one
investigated in Section 4 for robust watermarking pur-
poses, the robustness and transparency investigation
should be resumed accordingly.
Third, from the result interpretation point of view, feed-
back provided by professional under the framework of the
SPY project brought to light that when an I-Group is mal-
iciously altered, it is very likely to have other successive blocks
altered. Consequently, the decision according to Eq. (18) is
followed by a post-processing rule of the type: one I-Group is
considered as altered if at least two I-Groups that succeed it or
precede it are detected as altered.5.2. Functional evaluation
The experiments investigate the robustness, fragility
and transparency properties, for a prescribed data payload
value, set by the size of the authentication signature (i.e.
4.5 kbits/min).
First, under the semi-fragile watermarking framework,
transcoding and additive noise are the most harmless
authorized attacks. Consequently, Section 5.2.1 investi-
gates the BER after these attacks, for prescribed transpar-
ency (average PSNR¼32 dB).
Second, the fragility is investigated in Section 5.2.2 by
computing the Precision and Recall rates when identifying
the content altered blocks at fixed robustness (maximal
BER of 0.170.03 after transcoding). The same transpar-
ency constraint is kept (average PSNR¼32 dB).Finally, the transparency is assessed in Section 5.2.3 for
prescribed robustness/fragility limits (maximal BER of
0.170.03 and minimal Precision and Recall of 0.9).
Note that current day video surveillance cameras are
mainly IP-based and generate SD content; hence our study
considers only an SD corpus. The experiments were carried
out on a video surveillance corpus composed of 8 sequences
of 10 min each, downloaded from internet [29] or recorded
under the framework of the SPY project. Their content is
heterogeneous, combining city streets, highways, industrial
objectives, shopping centers, … This corpus is encoded in
MPEG-4 AVC in Baseline Profile (no B frames, CAVLC
entropy encoder) at 512 kbps, 640480 pixel frames; the
GOP size is set to 8.
Four m values and three quantization steps Δ are
compared all through the study, namely mAf2; 3; 5; 7g
and ΔA 50;70;90f g. Each and every time, α¼ αnþ0:4, see
the discussion in Section 3.3.
5.2.1. Robustness
This section investigates the robustness of the semi-
fragile watermarking method based on m-QIM against
transcoding (down to 25% from the original stream bit rate)
and bipolar noise addition, for a data payload of 4.5 kbit/
min. The average transparency is set to PSNR¼32 dB. Fig. 19
illustrates the BER as a function of m, whenmAf2; 3; 5; 7g,
Δ¼ 70 and α¼ αnþ0:04.
The BER values reported in Fig. 19 prove the robustness
of the semi-fragile method against the investigated attacks:
average BER of 0.08 and 0 against transcoding and additive
noise are obtained, respectively. It can also be noticed that
the BER is quite constant with respect to m, its variance
being lower than 4104. These numerical values are
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intervals [26] computed for the BER after the transcoding
resulted in relative errors lower than 5103 (the BER in
the bipolar noise addition was constantly equal to 0; hence,
no confidence interval has been computed).
The experiments are resumed so as to investigate the
robustness behavior as a function of Δ. This time, m¼ 5
and ΔA 50;90f g, see Table 8.
When keeping the same transparency constraints,
Δ¼ 90 results in relative decreases of the BER by a factor
of 0.14, while Δ¼ 50 results in a relative increase of the
BER by a factor of 1.28; these relative gains are computed
by (28). Table 8 demonstrates that, at least from the
robustness point of view, a value Δ¼ 50 is no longer of
practical relevance. Note that these results confirm the
theoretical ground as well as the behaviour which was
experimentally identified in Section 4.2: the larger the Δ
value, the better the robustness.5.2.2. Fragility evaluation
The video content is considered as being altered when
one object is removed, inserted or substituted. To simulate0
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Fig. 19. BER as a function of m for Δ¼ 70.
Table 8
Robustness behavior as function of Δ, m¼ 5.
Δ 50 70 90
Transcoding (BER) 0.16 0.07 0.06
Relative gain (ρÞ 1.28 0 0.14this attack, we wrote a piece of code that tampers the
marked video by arbitrarily changing 1/81 areas of the frame.
From the fragility point of view, an ideal watermarking
method should fail in detecting the mark from each and
every area which was subject to content alterations, thus
identifying the altered area. While such a behavior can be
also expressed in terms of probability of missed detection
and false alarm, the literature brings to light two more
detailed measures, namely the Precision and the Recall
ratios, defined as follows [30].
Precision¼ tp=ðtpþ f pÞ; Recall¼ tp=ðtpþ f nÞ
where tp is the number of true positive (i.e. the number of
content modified areas which do not allow the mark to be
recovered), f p is the false positive (i.e. the number of
content preserved areas which do not allow the mark to be
recovered) and f n is the false negative number (i.e. the
number of content modified areas which allow the mark to
be detected).
Fig. 20 illustrates the obtained Precision and Recall
values as a function of m, for Δ¼ 70.
Fig. 20 shows average values for Precision and Recall of
0.92 and 0.95, respectively. The Precision and Recall value
are quite constant with respect to m, the relative variances
being of of 6105 and 9105, respectively.
The above fragility experiments are resumed for Δ¼ 50
and Δ¼ 90; this time m¼ 5, see Table 9. With respect to
the case Δ¼ 70, Δ¼ 90 results in a quite constant Precision
and Recall values. However, Δ¼ 50 results in important
relative decrease by a factor of 0.4 and 0.29, respectively.
The relative gains are computed according to (28). Hence,
the fragility property also refutes the Δ¼ 50 value (see
Section 5.2.1).
5.2.3. Transparency
The transparency of the semi-fragile watermarking
method is assessed considering the same three types of
metrics as in Section 4.3.7
Precision
Recall
a function of m (Δ¼ 70).
Table 9
Fragility behavior as function of Δ, m¼ 5.
Precision Recall
Δ 50 70 90 50 70 90
Value 0.55 0.92 0.9 0.68 0.97 0.95
Relative gain (ρ) 0.4 0 0.02 0.29 0 0.02
AAD (x10-3)PSNR (dB)
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Fig. 21. PSNR and AAD as a function of m (Δ¼ 70): average values and 95% confidence limits.
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Fig. 22. SC and NCC as a function of m (Δ¼ 70): average values and 95% confidence limits.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
2 3 5 7
Fig. 23. DVQ as a function of m (Δ¼ 70): average values and 95%
confidence limits.
3 In order to allow a synoptic comparison with robust watermarking,
the same axis ranges as in Figs. 15 to 17 are kept.
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robustness expressed by a BER¼0.170.03 against
transcoding while the fragility is kept at Precision andRecall rates larger than 0.9. The same four m value are
investigated, namely m A{2, 3, 5, 7}.
The experimental results are reported in Figs. 21 to 233.
These numeric values meet the a priori expectancies: the
transparency increases with m. This behavior is assessed by
computing the η coefficient defined by (29), see Table 10.
The transparency investigation is resumed for Δ¼ 90
and m¼ 5. Note that Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 demonstrate
that Δ¼ 50 is unable to meet the robustness/fragility
requirements. With respect to the case Δ¼ 70, Δ¼ 90
results in a significantly depreciated transparency, see
Table 11 where the relative gains, computed according to
(28), are reported. Consequently, Δ¼ 90 is no longer of
practical relevance.5.3. Conclusion
This section studies the usefulness of the m-QIM
technique for semi-fragile MPEG-4 AVC video watermark-
ing. Such an application requires a data payload 30 times
larger than in the robust watermarking case. It was
Table 10
Variation of the quality metric with respect to m, Δ¼ 70.
PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ
η 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.06 0.23
Table 11
Quality metric behavior as function of Δ, m¼ 5.
PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ
Δ¼ 70 42 1.42 0.98 0.97 0.07
Δ¼ 90 35 2.41 0.96 0.95 0.10
Relative gain (ρ) 0.15 0.7 0.02 0.02 0.42
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fragility property be properly achieved while having as
main benefit an increase of the transparency by a factor of
0.1 in PSNR, 0.06 in NCC and 0.23 in DVQ. However, this
application is more restrictive than the robust watermark-
ing with respect to interval to which the Δ value belongs.
In order to also allow an overall comparison between
our m-QIM framework and state of the art binary QIM
approaches, we resumed the experiment for the method in
[6]. The robustness experiments (cf. Section 5.2.1) brought
to light average BER values of 0 and 0.25, after the additive
noise and transcoding attacks, respectively. As the latter
BER value, computed with a 95% relative error of 0.011 is
that high, we can state that the method in [6] does not meet
our targeted semi-fragile watermarking requirements. Con-
sequently, the fragility (cf. Section 5.2.2) and transparency
(cf. Section 5.2.3) were not performed for the method in [6].6. Conclusion
The present study generalized the QIM watermarking
techniques from binary to the m-ary case. From the
theoretical point of view, the insertion/detection rules
are paired derived so as to minimize the probability of
error under white Gaussian noise attacks.
While the m-QIM can be potentially applied to any
insertion domain, our experimental study considers the
quantized residual coefficients of the MPEG-4 AVC stream,
and investigates the possibility of designing both robust
and semi-fragile applications.
First, the robust watermarking investigation is carried
out on 1 h of video content encoded at two resolutions (SD
and HD). It is thus demonstrated that: while keeping fixed robustness and transparency, the
data payload is increased by a factor of log2m; while imposing fixed transparency and data payload,
the robustness is quite constant with respect to m; while setting a prescribed data robustness and data
payload, an average relative increase by a factor of 0.1
and 0.01 of PSNR and an average relative decrease by a
factor of 0.23 and 0.16 of DVQ are achieved in the SD
case and HD case.for a quite broad interval of Δ values, ranging from 50 to 90.
Second, under the semi-fragile watermarking frame-Such results are brought to light for mA{2, 3, 5, 7} and
work, the experiments consider a strong data payload
constraint (4.5 kbit/min) imposed by the signature size. It
is demonstrated that: while imposing a prescribed transparency, the robust-
ness and the fragility are quite constant with respect to
m; while keeping fixed robustness/fragility constraints, the
transparency is increased by 0.1 in PSNR, 0.06 in NCC
and 0.23 in DVQ.These results are obtained at the expense of restricting
the Δ parameter to a quite narrow interval centered on 70.
Note that the MPEG-4 AVC watermarking by means of
m-QIM technique avoids complex operations by requiring
just binary MPEG-4 AVC encoding/decoding and m-QIM
quantization operations.
These overall results demonstrate that the m-QIM
watermarking technique outperforms the state-of-the art
studies presented in Section 2. Hence, we can state thatm-
QIM technique is an unitary theoretical framework jointly
reaching functional equilibrium for both robust and semi-
fragile watermarking applications.
Further work will be carried out on both theoretical
and applicative aspects. From the theoretical point of view,
the extension of the m-QIM insertion/detection rule out-
side the Gaussian noise hypothesis is the first step. From
the applicative point of view, the overall data payload–
robustness–transparency results featured by the m-QIM
framework encourage us to go beyond robust and semi-
fragile watermarking and to consider other potential
watermarking use-cases like broadcast and Internet mon-
itoring [1], visual content filtering and classification [32],
asset and content management [32] and e-commerce [32].
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